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THE NEW YORK ADMINISTRATIVE
CORPS PROPOSAL:
ANOTHER VIEW

1/

-William J. Cowan, Esq.

Introduction
Thank you for the opportunity to present the views of the
Department of Public Service on proposed legislation in New York that
would create a State Office of Administrative Hearings for the purpose
of consolidating in one agency the administrative hearing responsibilities of all state agencies that conduct adjudicatory hearings.
I am the Executive Deputy to Chairman Bradford.
Before
assuming this position, I served as the Public Service Commission's
Chief Administrative Law Judge and Director of its Office of Administrative Hearings from 1980-1987.
I am also currently Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Administrative Law Judges of the National Association
of Regulatory Utility Commissioners.

1/ Statement on behalf of the Department of Public Service to the
Assembly Standing Committee on Governmental Operations and the Senate
Standing Committee on Commerce, Economic Development and Small
Business on proposed legislation to establish an independent State
Office of Administrative Hearings, presented by William J. Cowan,
Executive Deputy to the Chairman, Public Service Commission,
February 2, 1988.
Mr. Cowan is currently serving as Executive Deputy to the Chairman of the New York Public Service Commission.
He was the Commission's Chief Administrative Law Judge from 1980 to 1987.
He was firsl
appointed an Administrative Law Judge in 1976 by then Chairman Alfred
E. Kahn, after serving as Director of the Commission's Office of
Opinion and Review.
He is a graduate of the School of Law at Northeastern University in Boston.
Before undertaking a legal career, he
served as an Industry Economist with the then Federal Power Commissio:
and held positions in contract administration and procurement with
General Electric's navy and commercial nuclear power divisions.
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Some Reasons for Establishing a Central Office
The concept of a state corps of Administrative Law Judges
has been adopted in several jurisdictions, most notably in my view, in
New Jersey and Minnesota.
The rationales typically advanced for establishment of a
statewide panel of Administrative Law Judges seem unexceptionable in
principle. The driving force for the concept is an anticipated
improvement in the perception and reality of fairness in the conduct
of the state's administrative hearings. No one can quarrel with that
objective. One only has to look at the transcript of the hearings
held to date on the proposed state legislation to realize that this
goal is not always achieved in our state's existing hearing process.
One fundamental point deserves emphasis -- a state administrative agency hearing to determine the legal rights, duties or
privileges of an individual must be impartial and fair. The hearing
officer must be objective and unbiased. He or she should not have, or
seem to have, an interest in the outcome of the case, other than that
it be decided fairly, with proper regard for due process and in accord
with substantive law.
Another basis frequently advanced for establishment of a
statewide Office of Administrative Law Judges is an expected improvement in the efficiency of hearings likely to flow from a better
allocation of agency staff resources and consequent savings in cost
and expenses from centralization. Again, this seems to be a highly
laudable goal -- who can argue against improvements in efficiency and
cost savings?
Yet another reason offered in support of the centralization
concept, and also one which is unassailable, has to do with the
quality of administrative decision making. It is thought that improvements in the quality of decision making will flow from centralized
control over recruitment, training and the work products of Administrative Law Judges.
What's Wrona with the Existing System
Before concluding that centralization of the hearing function in a new state agency makes ultimate sense, it seems appropriate
to ask the question: Why doesn't the state's existing system de-liver
fair, impartial, efficient and high quality hearings, if indeed it
does not? My personal view is that our existing system, while far
from perfect, does come very close to meeting the ideals that motivate
the sponsors of this legislation. In short, there may be insufficient
reason for the sweeping changes called for in this legislation. It

may be that we can move even closer to our common goals with less
drastic changes in approach. Moreover, there are strong reasons to
prefer a decentralized approach to the conduct of the state's administrative hearings. Let me first discuss the reasons why I believe such
hearings should remain under the purview of the individual agencies.

Some Reasons to Prefer a Decentralized Approach
The first requires us to recall why we have administrative
agency adjudication at all.
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis tells us in
his treatise on Administrative Law that the fundamental reasons for
the growth of the administrative process include the following:
1.

It was more practical to have certain tasks, such as determination of entitlements due to claimants under particular
statutes, decided by specialists in that field than by the
legislature or the courts. This led to the creation of
administrative agencies.

2.

Economic regulation of rates required a governmental authority with power not only to adjudicate but to initiate
proceedings, investigate, prosecute and issue regulations,
all tasks better performed by an administrative agency with
special expertise than by the legislature or the courts.

3.

Legislative and judicial processes, the principal alternatives to the administrative process, fell short of providing
what was needed.
Legislatures are ill suited for handling
masses of detail and courts rather obviously cannot furnish
the accounting, engineering and other technical skills

required to fix rates or grant licenses in complicated
economic circumstances.
4.

The public demanded a speedy, inexpensive and simple procedure -- a 9 one which keeps the roles of lawyers to a
minimum. -

The common denominator in all of the above is the fundamental understanding that the tasks of an administrative agency can

best be accomplished by a staff of professionals trained in the
expertise of the particular agency -- so that claims can be adjudicated more swiftly, licenses granted or denied by agency staff skilled
in the particular field and rates set in accord with statutes and

2/ Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, Section 1.05.

principles understood by the agency. Thus, special expertise was an
important consideration in the formation of the administrative agencies themselves.
The testimony of senior representatives of several state
agencies at these hearings demonstrates the importance of having
hearing officers knowledgeable about the laws and regulations of the
agency and familiar with complicated facts likely to come into the
record in that agency's proceedings. This raison d'etre for administrative agencies will lose a lot of its force if an agency's hearings
become the responsibility of a central panel of Administrative Law
Judges without the special expertise of the agency itself. We might
Indeed, we might
as well turn over agency adjudication to the courts.
even prefer to think in terms of specialized courts to handle these
types of adjudications rather than go in a direction inconsistent with
the underlying principles of administrative agency adjudication.
There are other reasons to prefer in-house control over
agency administrative hearings. A central panel necessarily involves
establishment of a new bureaucracy with concomitant increased expense.
It is by no means certain that cost savings of individual agencies
from a centralized panel structure will be enough to offset the costs
of the new bureaucracy. From which I have read and discussed with
others, I think the jury is still out on the cost issue.
Centralization also brings with it an increased emphasis on
judicialization of administrative agency hearings. Professor Davis
noted that the public was looking for a speedy, cheap and simple
procedure, a procedure which keeps the role of lawyers to a minimum.
Agency Administrative Law Judges are familiar with the types of
claimants and other individuals appearing before them. They are also
very familiar with the agency's rules and the statutes which they are
administering. An Administrative Law Judge from a central panel, on
the other hand, is more likely to resort to a more formal structure
and process that could intimidate individual claimants and other
parties appearing before the agency. That atmosphere may cause
parties to feel a need for legal counsel to represent them in hearings.
The increased formality of hearings also runs counter to the
growing movement in our society toward alternative dispute resolution
techniques, such as case settlement through mediation, negotiation and
arbitration.
Centralization is also likely to lead to less informed
decision making at the administrative agency level if the hearing
officer's recommended decision or report is prepared by an individual
I would note,
lacking in the technical expertise of the agency.
parenthetically, that, at the Public Service Commission, it is the
Administrative Law Judge's responsibility to assure that the record is
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complete on all issues. In a centralized system, that responsibility
would fall to agency staff, because of the Administrative Law Judge's
likely lack of expertise. The agency would also lose control over the
timing of cases and policy direction, to the extent that the latter is
deemed desirable. The most important point, of course, is that
Administrative Law Judges do not come with fungible experience. An
individual trained in the application of motor vehicle statutes and
regulations would simply not be able to handle the type of proceeding
that the Public Service Commission routinely conducts into rates and
the practices of large complex public utilities. And to the answer
frequently heard that Judges do not need to have technical knowledge
to decide cases, I will repeat my earlier comment that we have administrative agencies precisely because we don't want Judges operating in
these highly technical areas without subject matter knowledge.
Some Alternatives to Centralization
So that I don't leave you with the impression that I think
any movement toward centralized control over the administrative
hearing process is the devil incarnate, there may be modifications
that we can make to the state's existing practices and procedures to
move closer toward a realization of the objectives of a centralized
office, without the attendant problems. The first that occurs to me,
and the most desirable in my view, is the establishment of a semiautonomous Office of Administrative Hearings within each state administrative agency that conducts adjudicatory and rule-making hearings
under the State Administrative Procedure Act. This is exactly the
kind of organization we have at the New York Public Service Commission. I understand that the Department of State and other agencies
have similar structures. Other agencies would do well to consider
following this lead. Indeed, it might even be desirable to amend the
State Administrative Procedure Act to require each administrative
agency to establish a semi-autonomous office of administrative hearings
Each agency would then have a group of professional hearing officers
There would be no loss of subject matter
in an independent office.
expertise under this system. While the Administrative Law Judges
would continue to be employees of the agencies, their independence
would be somewhat more assured than it is currently. This, in turn,
would improve the perception that Administrative Law Judges are
independent and able to conduct fair and impartial hearings.
I can attest from personal experience for the past seven
years as the Chief Administrative Law Judge of an agency much in the
public view that the concept of a semi-autonomous entity within the
organizational structure of the agency itself is one that works fairly
well. This is not to suggest that this type of organizational strucOne can always distrust the motives of
ture is free from problems.
the agency head and you may not always have agency commissioners
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willing to tolerate the existence within the agency of an independent
partly autonomous office. It is human nature that the desire to
control the decision-making process of the Administrative Law Judges
will always exist to some degree. But one has to place some trust in
the executive appointment system. In my experience, the individuals
occupying the seat of Chairman at the PSC have always recognized the
benefits of having an independent corps of trained professional
Administrative Law Judges, even if they sometimes disagreed with their
recommendations.
Yet another possible way of achieving some of the benefits
of the current system with minor modification would be to maintain a
central register of Administrative Law Judges at the State Office of
Employee Relations for compensation, promotion and training functions,
while keeping the Administrative Law Judges resident in their individual agencies.
This is akin to the existing federal system. One
advantage of this arrangement is that it would make Administrative Law
Judges independent of agency politics and free from agency influence.
Moreover, it would improve the perception of Administrative Law Judge
independence. The centralized control over personnel actions also
would permit recognition of different levels of Administrative Law
Judges depending upon experience and other pertinent factors. Centralization of training and quality control would likely enhance
individual agency initial decisions. Of course, this type of an
arrangement would maintain the subject matter expertise of Administrative Law Judges within the agencies, preserving this important benefit
of the current system.

Some Comments on the Bill's Applicability
to the Public Service Commission
I would like to briefly outline some of the specific problems that I see with the proposed legislation vis-a-vis the Public
Service Commission. First, we strongly believe that parties who
participate in Public Service Commission hearings receive fair and
impartial treatment and that due process protections are extended
equally to all parties. We take some solace that the current draft of
the bill would not make its provisions applicable to most of the
Commission's proceedings, because they are more often than not considered rule makings under SAPA. We are concerned, however, because,
although the bill is currently limited to adjudicatory hearings, it
could at some later date be broadened to include rate-making and other
types of rule-making proceedings conducted by the Public Service
Commission. We believe this would be highly undesirable. Even in its
present form the bill causes our agency difficulties. Cases arising
under Section 68 of the Public Service Law involving the exercise of
gas and electric franchises and Article VII and VIII proceedings
involving the siting of major electric generating and transmission
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facilities are adjudicatory and would fall under the provisions of
this statute. These types of cases are among the most technical and
complex that we handle.
It would be extremely problematical for our
agency if these cases were bound to be heard before Administrative Law
Judges that do not have technical expertise in our field.
We are also troubled by the provision of the legislation
that would require each Administrative Law Judge be admitted to
practice law in New York for five years. Our agency historically and
currently has utilized non-attorneys successfully as Administrative
Law Judges. At a minimum, those individuals currently serving as
Administrative Law Judges should be grandfathered into their positions
and accorded full Administrative Law Judge status under the law.
Moreover, the idea that one must be an attorney to serve competently
as a hearing officer is simply wrong in my experience, particularly
where the matters at issue are technical and complex and the overriding concern is the public interest rather than the rights of individuals.
In many highly technical cases we assign Administrative Law
Judges who have a background in engineering or other sciences because
they are better able to ensure the development of a comprehensive
record through questioning of witnesses and rulings that require the
parties to address certain issues. Additionally, these Judges may be
more proficient in analyzing complex, technical issues and this
advantage can often be observed in the quality of their recommended
decisions.
It would be a serious disadvantage to preclude from service
as Administrative Law Judges individuals who have the requisite
technical expertise and who through experience have learned the
administrative process.
The legislation would also make recruitment
of Administrative Law Judges from outside of New York very difficult.
The Public Service Commission has historically recruited nationally
for its Administrative Law Judges, and we have been able to attract
highly qualified candidates throughout the country to positions in
New York.
In conclusion, I would like to reemphasize three basic
points.
First, the proposed legislation seems to be trying to fix
something that may not be broken. To the extent that it is broken,
there is a good chance that the system can be repaired -- it does not
need to be replaced. Second, there is a very good reason why Administrative Law Judges now reside within the individual agencies and that
is to take advantage of their experience with the statutes they
administer and their knowledge of the particular jurisdictional field
of the agency. This is one of the principal rationales for the
existence of administrative agencies themselves and ought not to be
discarded without careful consideration of alternatives. And third,
an alternative that has worked well for the Public Service Commission,
and I think would work well in many other agencies, is the creation of

semi-autonomous office of administrative hearings within each state
dministrative agency. This type of organization will go a long way
oward resolving some of the perceived problems with the existing
tructure while preserving all of its inherent advantages.

